LIBERADIO(!)

Look who joined the proofer movement!

It’s been seventeen days since I last wrote to State Election Coordinator Mark Goins. I am still waiting for a reply.

Let’s start at the beginning.

In 2008, the Tennessee General Assembly passed the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act, which would have given Tennesseans four important elements to help ensure secure and verifiable elections:

1) Paper ballots
2) Removal of unverifiable paperless touch screen electronic voting machines to be replaced with optical scan machines (to count the paper ballots)
3) The paper ballot becomes the ballot of record in case of a recount. (The touch screen electronic voting system we have now only has one mechanism in place for a recount – press the same button again and get a repeat of the exact same totals you got before).
4) Mandatory random post-election audits in 3% of precincts (to insure that the Optical Scan machines are functioning properly).

During last session, Republicans tried to kill the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act, but when they couldn’t get that done they tried to delay it until 2012. The delay failed as well. Now, because they are left with no other option, Secretary of State Tre Hargett and State Election Coordinator Mark Goins, are simply refusing to implement the law.

In the early part of August, I was compared to a “birther” (people who don’t believe that President Obama is an American citizen) because a) I believe the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act could be implemented and the Republican Secretary of State is simply refusing to do so, and b) I don’t think any votes ever cast during any election using the 100% unverifiable electronic voting machines we use now in 93 out of 95 counties in Tennessee has ever been recorded accurately, as per the voters’ intent. Ever.

So, on August 10, 2009 I started Operation: P.O.P. (Please offer proof) – a.k.a. the “proofer” movement – in which I called on Secretary of State Hargett and State Election Coordinator Goins (who doesn’t think there’s anything wrong with the voting machines we use now) to present proof to the voters of Tennessee that one vote cast electronic voting machines has ever been recorded accurately.

I sent a letter to that effect to Mr. Hargett and Mr. Goins and two days later I received a reply from Mr. Goins. It was clear from his response that he either didn’t understand my request or couldn’t give me an answer. First, after making sure that I knew that he was not responsible for making the decision to purchase the 100% unverifiable electronic voting machines (“Decisions were made by the election commissions in each of those counties about what type of equipment to purchase”) he explained the testing procedure (“…the machines are tested prior to purchase, upon delivery and again before each election in each county…”) and suggested that I contact individual election administrators from each of the counties that use the 100% unverifiable electronic voting machines to witness testing procedures.

I felt nicely put off. But I did not feel as if my question has been answered. Perhaps I made it too confusing so I broke it down and sent him another email:

Dear Mr. Goins,

Thank you for getting back to me and for reiterating the need for election equipment that meets the highest standards for security and reliability. That said, the decision to purchase the electronic voting machines is in the past so I do not feel it necessary to address the county election commissioners at this time.

I do feel it necessary, however, to concentrate on the security and verifiability of the 2010 election.

And while I do believe your explanation of the bi-partisan pre-purchase testing procedure and the invitation to contact the election administrators to see demonstrations of each machine might address my request to see the process in which the votes are cast, it does not address my request to see the process in which the votes are cast and counted accurately.

In other words, I would like verification that the software used on these machines is both recording and counting accurately.

Do you have any suggestions on how this may be accomplished?

It seemed clear enough now, I thought. On election day, can Tre Hargett, Mark Goins, any poll worker, or poll monitor look into the internal bits of a touchscreen electronic voting machine and see how the votes are being counted? Can we, as voters, feel certain that what goes in the machine is going to be what comes out at the end of the day tally? Where’s the proof?

I couldn’t wait for his reply. But I had to wait. For two days.

Ms. Mancini:

Once again I want to thank you for your interest in the election process. I also want to apologize if my previous e-mail was unclear. The purpose of testing the voting machines prior to each election is to verify not only that ballots were cast, but also that they were properly tabulated and recorded. This testing process has been used in numerous elections prior to the start of my tenure with the Division of Elections and I’m unaware of any serious concerns expressed by the participating candidates or the parties they represented. However, if you have specific questions about the voting machine hardware or software, it might be advisable to contact officials with the companies that supply the equipment. I would be happy to supply some contact information for those companies, if you are interested.

Again, thank you for your inquiry.

Again with the “not my responsiblity.” Sheesh. So I tried one more time.

Dear Mr. Goins,

I am once again writing for clarification.

Are you suggesting that the testing done on the touch-screen machines prior to an election guarantees that every vote cast on election day on said machines will be counted and counted as cast?

If so, how can you be sure?

Do the companies that make the machines provide access to the counting software so that if can be verified and studied by your office? Can the companies that make the machines guarantee that the counting software is free of bugs, i.e. perfect and never makes mistakes during either the testing process or when they are live on election day? Can the companies that make the machines guarantee that the vote count cannot be manipulated in the source code or by introducing a virus in one of the unsecure data ports? Can the companies that make the machines guarantee that if one of the machines crashed or malfunctions, as computers are prone to do, that the votes on that machine will not be irretrievably lost? Can the companies also guarantee that each machine will be perfectly calibrated as to avoid vote flipping like the kind we saw last November?

Perhaps as the gentlemen in charge of building trust in our elections, you should contact the touch-screen electronic voting machine manufacturers for satisfactory answers to the above questions.

I also suggest that you read the following reports from the Brennan Center for Justice to better understand the serious concerns Tennesseans have about touch-screen electronic voting machines: http://www.brennancenter.org/content/section/category/voting_technology.

Or, you can simply look to the example of the Voter Confidence Act, which was passed almost unanimously in 2008 the State House and Senate by candidates who represent their political parties and recognized, as most of their constituents who want fair elections now do, the inherent unreliability and insecurity of touch-screen electronic voting machines.

Thank you again for your time.

The above email was sent on August 18. It’s September and I’ve yet to hear back from either State Election Coordinator Goins or Secretary of State Hargett.

Today I will resend my last email with the following addendum:

Dear Mr. Goins,

I am resending my email of August 18, 2009 in case it got lost in the flurry of emails you must receive on a daily basis. I look forward to your reply.

In addition, my offer for you to appear as a guest on Liberadio(!) with Mary Mancini & Freddie O’Connell to discuss the issue further, still stands.

More
Day 1: Operation P.O.P.
Day 2: Operation P.O.P.
Day 4: Operation P.O.P.
Another Proofer
Day 9: Operation P.O.P.
WPLN: Voting Machine Dispute Wears On as 2010 Election Nears
If You Hold an Election, Cheaters will Come
Computer Scientist Says Yes to Paper Ballots
Media (and some bloggers) missing the point of Tennessee election reform controversy