All Tennesseans believe we deserve fair and accurate elections. This belief unites us as Tennesseans like no other. Heck, I’d even go as far as to say it united us as Americans.

So when I read yesterday that Secretary of State Tre Hargett was going to move forward with purchasing the optical scan machines needed to count the paper ballots that the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act (TVCA) of 2008 mandates we use in November 2010, I was overcome with comfort and joy.

You see, those of use who have been urging implementation of the TVCA were elated when last month the protracted battle over implementation of the TVCA was put to rest and the Act, which was overwhelmingly supported by the people of Tennessee through their legislature, was now also fully validated by the courts.

It seemed, we believed, that Tennesseans were finally going to get the fair and accurate elections we deserve.

But then I read Jackson Baker’s Memphis Flyer article a little more closely and I realized, uh-oh, what we’re actually going to get is some post-holiday coal in our little red bootie stockings thingies.

FAIR AND ACCURATE. “I think we’ve got a 2005-quality machine,” Secretary of State Hargett said in a meeting in Memphis earlier this week, inferring that an optical scan machine made in any other year would be inadequate.

I’d like to clear up a few inaccuracies that Mr. Hargett’s chock-full one sentence statement infers.

First, the TVCA was passed to give us paper ballots, not voting machines. The paper ballots would not only record the voter’s intent but would also become the ballot of record in the case of a close election. In other words, the strength of the bill is in the paper ballot and not the machine that count the ballots. I mean, be good for goodness sake!, we could hand count the paper ballots in case of emergency and skip the machine counting process completely. Paper ballots are to optical scan machines as portable hard drives are to your computer.

To put it more simply, paper ballots give Tennesseans control over the results of our elections by giving us the ability to oversee, recount, and audit. In other words, trust but verify.

Mr. Baker followed up Mr. Hargett’s statement with an editorial comment, rife with inaccuracies: “‘I think we’ve got a 2005-quality machine,’ Hargett said in Memphis Tuesday night. Meaning that an optical-scan voting apparatus with paper-trail capability would soon be available in enough quantity to conduct statewide elections in 2010.”

The paper ballot – and the voters intent – gets counted by the optical scan machine. Or counted by hand if necessary. The optical scan machine does not produce a paper trail nor does it give the voter a receipt.

Again, the TVCA puts the emphasis on the paper ballot – not on the machines that count them – because Tennesseans prefer paper ballots that produce something tangible that they can oversee, recount, and audit. This is a much better system than the paperless electronic touch-screen voting machines we currently use that count votes using software that no one is allowed to see or monitor.

BI-PARTISAN. Accurate elections are the responsibility of the people of Tennessee, and the people of Tennessee want paper ballots. That’s why the TVCA was passed almost unanimously (when the hell does that ever happen?) in the General Assembly in 2008 – that means that 56 out of a possible 60 Republicans and 68 out of a possible 68 Democrats voted for the TVCA.

It truly was a bi-partisan effort.

The bill to delay the TVCA that Mr. Hargett mentions in the article is a divisive issue to be sure, and will most likely be brought to the Senate floor for a vote by Lt. Governor Ron Ramsey by January of 2010. This bill not only delays until 2012 the date the Act must be implemented, but also guts the mandatory audit procedures.

The audit procedures that would alert us to any problem with the vote count.

Again, Tennesseans want and deserve fair and accurate elections, but how can we make sure our elections are fair and accurate unless we are able to randomly audit the results?

FISCALLY RESPONSIBLE “The real question is if there are other costs required of the counties. We can purchase the machines, but that’s all we can do,” Mr. Hargett said, admitting that the state has approximately $34 million federal dollars available that can only be used by the state to purchase election equipment.”

In these uncertain economic times, all Tennesseans are focused on fiscal responsibility. But if our concern is saving money, the best thing we can do is implement the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act.

For example, with the TVCA only one Optical Scan machines is needed per precinct instead of the multiple machines needed with the paperless electronic touch screen voting system we use now.

And because we eliminate up to 80% of existing equipment when we move to paper ballots counted by optical scan machines, counties will save the money they now spend to program, service, test, store and transport so many unnecessary paperless electronic touch-screen machines.

In fact, studies in Florida, Maryland, and North Carolina have confirmed that voting with paper ballots counted by optical scan machines is 30-40% cheaper than voting the way we do now because of the reduction in programming, software, maintenance, storage and transportation costs.

We’re all hyper-aware that local budgets are strained and that necessary services run the risk of being cut. But fair and accurate elections are the most necessary of all our public structures. They are what gives life to all the others.

Look at it this way, your vote is your voice. And if your vote doesn’t get counted for the candidate who will vote with you on the issue or issues most important to you, then your participation in our democracy is an illusion.

All Tennesseans believe we deserve fair and accurate elections. The Tennessee Voter Confidence, aptly named, gives them to us.

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An article about the broken voting machines we use in Tennessee - from almost 2 years ago.

An article about the broken voting machines we use in Tennessee - from almost 2 years ago.

Last week, the Memphis Flyer ran an editorial about the impact of the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act on touch-screen electronic voting machines by Rich Holden, the chief administrator for the Shelby County Election Commission.

Mr. Holden’s assertion that “the General Assembly should revise the act’s deadline provisions or, better, rethink it altogether” is being eviscerated in the comments section of the piece (“Holden’s initial premise – ‘if it ain’t broke’ – has been demonstrated to be way off the mark by all credible studies of DREs [electronic voting machines],…” etc..), with the only agreement coming from someone who can’t be bothered to give his real name.

There’s really nothing new in Holden’s editorial that we haven’t already heard from people who for whatever reason refuse to accept that the election machine system in Tennessee is already broken. What really stands out is what he didn’t say.

Nowhere in his editorial does he mention that the touch screen machines we use now simply do not work. They are broken and as such they cannot be trusted to record the votes of Tennesseans accurately. Recently we’ve seen an example how these machines malfunction (vote flipping) during the special election last month in Williamson County. And we’ve seen countless other instances of these machines malfunctioning since 2006.

The broken machines even made Newsweek (“Short-circuiting the vote”) and the NY Times (“Can you count on voting machines?”) and in October 2008, the Brennan Center for Justice, the non-partisan public research and law institute, sent a letter telling the Secretaries of State in 16 states that the machines didn’t work.

Nor does Mr. Holden address the importance of giving Tennesseans secure and accurate elections or how continuing to use these broken touch-screen electronic voting machines inherently diminishes that importance.

The people of Tennessee deserve secure and accurate elections, not broken machines, and any election administrator who refuses to replace these broken machines is failing in his trusted pursuit to give the people of Tennessee true access to the democratic process.

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Who did your ES&S touch screen electronic voting machine vote for?

Who did your ES&S touch screen electronic voting machine vote for?

Secretary of State Tre Hargett is the person in charge of elections in Tennessee. His job is to:

1) Guarantee that our election process is secure
2) Give us working systems that accurately record each vote
3) Ensure that the right candidate wins

In other words, Mr. Hargett is entrusted with the most fundamental tool of our democracy.

So, why does he want a machine to pick your candidate for you?

Earlier this month during a special election in Williamson County, Karen Carter attempted to vote for one candidate and the ES&S iVotronic touch screen electronic voting machine flipped the vote to his opponent.

Karen didn’t vote. The machine voted for Karen.

Tennessee uses the ES&S iVotronic touch-screen electronic voting machine in 17 counties.

So is this incident of a machine instead of a voter choosing an elected representative isolated to Williamson County?

No.

During the 2008 presidential election, a voter in Davidson County touched the screen for one candidate only to have the box next to another candidate light up. (Ironically, it was the wife of Uncounted filmmaker, David Earnhardt).

So are both of these incidences of a machine instead of a voter choosing elected representatives isolated to Tennessee?

No.

In 2008 there were also incidences of machines choosing our elected representatives on the same iVotronic touch screen electronic machines recorded in Jackson, Putnam, Berkeley, Ohio, Monongalia and Greenbrier counties in West Virginia.

And in Saline County, Kansas, the rise of the iVotronic touch screen electronic voting machines also occurred in three precincts. The local paper described the problem:

“When a voter pressed a certain candidate’s bar on the voting machine’s screen, the candidate above the selected candidate instead received the checkmark.”

Machines choosing our elected officials is a well-documented problem (also in Texas!) that affects 22,619 ES&S iVotronic voting machines.

In October 2008, the Brennan Center warned the Secretaries of State in 16 states of this problem.

Tennessee was one of those states.

Even though the ES&S machines have well-documented problems and there is a Tennessee law in place that, if implemented, would disenfranchised machines and enfranchise, you know, the citizens of the state, Mr. Hargett refuses to give Tennesseans back their precious right to vote by throwing these machines on the trash heap where they belong.

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Summary: Featuring guests Ben Tribbett, Executive Director of Accountability Now! PAC, Dr. Reginald Coopwood, CEO of the Nashville Hospital Authority, and Karl Frisch of Media Matters for America.

Part 1 Mary prepares to unleash (ha!) the congressman Barney Frank on Halloween households all across America and if you think that’s scary, what until you hear what Republican State Senator Ron Ramsey wants to do to fair elections in Tennessee. Plus, Mary and Freddie try to understand just what, exactly, Ben Trippett and Accountability Now PAC have uncovered about Coop. [22.62MB download mp3]

Audio clip: Adobe Flash Player (version 9 or above) is required to play this audio clip. Download the latest version here. You also need to have JavaScript enabled in your browser.

Part 2 Reginald Coopwood, M.D., CEO of the Nashville Hospital Authority tells us about their health facilities, the best-kept secret in Nashville, and Karl Frisch does his best Elbert Ventura impression in the next generation of the Media Matters for America Smackdown. Plus, President Obama’s foreign policy has all but isolated Iran from the world community. So why is the right-wing still calling him a surrender monkey? [22.62MB download mp3]

Audio clip: Adobe Flash Player (version 9 or above) is required to play this audio clip. Download the latest version here. You also need to have JavaScript enabled in your browser.

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Look who joined the proofer movement!

Look who joined the proofer movement!

It’s been seventeen days since I last wrote to State Election Coordinator Mark Goins. I am still waiting for a reply.

Let’s start at the beginning.

In 2008, the Tennessee General Assembly passed the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act, which would have given Tennesseans four important elements to help ensure secure and verifiable elections:

1) Paper ballots
2) Removal of unverifiable paperless touch screen electronic voting machines to be replaced with optical scan machines (to count the paper ballots)
3) The paper ballot becomes the ballot of record in case of a recount. (The touch screen electronic voting system we have now only has one mechanism in place for a recount – press the same button again and get a repeat of the exact same totals you got before).
4) Mandatory random post-election audits in 3% of precincts (to insure that the Optical Scan machines are functioning properly).

During last session, Republicans tried to kill the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act, but when they couldn’t get that done they tried to delay it until 2012. The delay failed as well. Now, because they are left with no other option, Secretary of State Tre Hargett and State Election Coordinator Mark Goins, are simply refusing to implement the law.

In the early part of August, I was compared to a “birther” (people who don’t believe that President Obama is an American citizen) because a) I believe the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act could be implemented and the Republican Secretary of State is simply refusing to do so, and b) I don’t think any votes ever cast during any election using the 100% unverifiable electronic voting machines we use now in 93 out of 95 counties in Tennessee has ever been recorded accurately, as per the voters’ intent. Ever.

So, on August 10, 2009 I started Operation: P.O.P. (Please offer proof) – a.k.a. the “proofer” movement – in which I called on Secretary of State Hargett and State Election Coordinator Goins (who doesn’t think there’s anything wrong with the voting machines we use now) to present proof to the voters of Tennessee that one vote cast electronic voting machines has ever been recorded accurately.

I sent a letter to that effect to Mr. Hargett and Mr. Goins and two days later I received a reply from Mr. Goins. It was clear from his response that he either didn’t understand my request or couldn’t give me an answer. First, after making sure that I knew that he was not responsible for making the decision to purchase the 100% unverifiable electronic voting machines (“Decisions were made by the election commissions in each of those counties about what type of equipment to purchase”) he explained the testing procedure (“…the machines are tested prior to purchase, upon delivery and again before each election in each county…”) and suggested that I contact individual election administrators from each of the counties that use the 100% unverifiable electronic voting machines to witness testing procedures.

I felt nicely put off. But I did not feel as if my question has been answered. Perhaps I made it too confusing so I broke it down and sent him another email:

Dear Mr. Goins,

Thank you for getting back to me and for reiterating the need for election equipment that meets the highest standards for security and reliability. That said, the decision to purchase the electronic voting machines is in the past so I do not feel it necessary to address the county election commissioners at this time.

I do feel it necessary, however, to concentrate on the security and verifiability of the 2010 election.

And while I do believe your explanation of the bi-partisan pre-purchase testing procedure and the invitation to contact the election administrators to see demonstrations of each machine might address my request to see the process in which the votes are cast, it does not address my request to see the process in which the votes are cast and counted accurately.

In other words, I would like verification that the software used on these machines is both recording and counting accurately.

Do you have any suggestions on how this may be accomplished?

It seemed clear enough now, I thought. On election day, can Tre Hargett, Mark Goins, any poll worker, or poll monitor look into the internal bits of a touchscreen electronic voting machine and see how the votes are being counted? Can we, as voters, feel certain that what goes in the machine is going to be what comes out at the end of the day tally? Where’s the proof?

I couldn’t wait for his reply. But I had to wait. For two days.

Ms. Mancini:

Once again I want to thank you for your interest in the election process. I also want to apologize if my previous e-mail was unclear. The purpose of testing the voting machines prior to each election is to verify not only that ballots were cast, but also that they were properly tabulated and recorded. This testing process has been used in numerous elections prior to the start of my tenure with the Division of Elections and I’m unaware of any serious concerns expressed by the participating candidates or the parties they represented. However, if you have specific questions about the voting machine hardware or software, it might be advisable to contact officials with the companies that supply the equipment. I would be happy to supply some contact information for those companies, if you are interested.

Again, thank you for your inquiry.

Again with the “not my responsiblity.” Sheesh. So I tried one more time.

Dear Mr. Goins,

I am once again writing for clarification.

Are you suggesting that the testing done on the touch-screen machines prior to an election guarantees that every vote cast on election day on said machines will be counted and counted as cast?

If so, how can you be sure?

Do the companies that make the machines provide access to the counting software so that if can be verified and studied by your office? Can the companies that make the machines guarantee that the counting software is free of bugs, i.e. perfect and never makes mistakes during either the testing process or when they are live on election day? Can the companies that make the machines guarantee that the vote count cannot be manipulated in the source code or by introducing a virus in one of the unsecure data ports? Can the companies that make the machines guarantee that if one of the machines crashed or malfunctions, as computers are prone to do, that the votes on that machine will not be irretrievably lost? Can the companies also guarantee that each machine will be perfectly calibrated as to avoid vote flipping like the kind we saw last November?

Perhaps as the gentlemen in charge of building trust in our elections, you should contact the touch-screen electronic voting machine manufacturers for satisfactory answers to the above questions.

I also suggest that you read the following reports from the Brennan Center for Justice to better understand the serious concerns Tennesseans have about touch-screen electronic voting machines: http://www.brennancenter.org/content/section/category/voting_technology.

Or, you can simply look to the example of the Voter Confidence Act, which was passed almost unanimously in 2008 the State House and Senate by candidates who represent their political parties and recognized, as most of their constituents who want fair elections now do, the inherent unreliability and insecurity of touch-screen electronic voting machines.

Thank you again for your time.

The above email was sent on August 18. It’s September and I’ve yet to hear back from either State Election Coordinator Goins or Secretary of State Hargett.

Today I will resend my last email with the following addendum:

Dear Mr. Goins,

I am resending my email of August 18, 2009 in case it got lost in the flurry of emails you must receive on a daily basis. I look forward to your reply.

In addition, my offer for you to appear as a guest on Liberadio(!) with Mary Mancini & Freddie O’Connell to discuss the issue further, still stands.

More
Day 1: Operation P.O.P.
Day 2: Operation P.O.P.
Day 4: Operation P.O.P.
Another Proofer
Day 9: Operation P.O.P.
WPLN: Voting Machine Dispute Wears On as 2010 Election Nears
If You Hold an Election, Cheaters will Come
Computer Scientist Says Yes to Paper Ballots
Media (and some bloggers) missing the point of Tennessee election reform controversy

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