Hacking Tennessee’s Vote

Email your Tennessee Senator to vote NO on SB0872 tomorrow. A YES vote on SB0872 means that in November, Tennesseans in 93 out of 95 counties will vote on machines that can be as easily hacked as the ones above.

No paper trail. Lost votes. Stolen Votes. Or the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act with paper ballots that leave a paper trail for recounts and audits?

See the entire Princeton study. Or if you still need to be convince, go watch clips from Uncounted. I recommend this one:

Are you crying for our almost lost election integrity? Homer is here for you.

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On the eve of HB0614 – the bill that would “delay” the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act (paper ballot bill) – once more going before the House Budget subcommittee, I would like to ask a few questions.

But first, a little background.

The Tennessee Voter Confidence Act – which was supported almost unanimously in the House and Senate and signed by an enthusiastic Governor Bredesen in 2008 – would have given Tennessee voter the three things which are almost universally accepted as ways to ensure fair elections:

1) Tennesseans would vote on paper ballots (which would capture our actual intent)
2) The paper ballot would become the ballot of record in case of a recount. (The paperless electronic voting machines we have now only have one mechanism in place for a recount – press the same button again and get a repeat of the exact same totals you got before).
3) Mandatory random post-election audits in 3% of precincts (to insure that the Optical Scan machines are functioning properly).

This year, after Republicans took control of the House for the first time in about 140 years, they decided this legislation supported overwhelmingly by both parties should be repealed. Rep. Curry Todd carried the legislation for the new secretary of state, Tre Hargett, and state election coordinator, Mark Goins, but after a complete repeal encountered some push back, they decided to try for a “delay of implementation” until 2012.

To push the delay they tried several different arguments. But after the first few fell flat, they settled on the fastest way to derail a bill on the Hill (especially during these economic times) – they attached a humongous fiscal note. But the note wasn’t for the cost of buying the new ballot counting machines – the optical scan machines – because that was a discussion that was had over and over and over again during the debate of the original bill and it was well known that this cost for the machines was being covered by 25 million dollars of federal funds (out of a total of 35 million available) leftover from the Help America Vote Act.

And so, a plan was hatched. Let’s survey the counties [xls] and see what they think it would cost to switch over to paper ballots. The resulting fiscal note [pdf] states that it will cost Tennessee counties over $11.7 million to conduct the 2010 elections using paper ballots counted on optical scan machines. But there’s a bit of a discrepancy with the numbers that produced the multi-million dollar figure. Just look at the range of “extra” costs:

Privacy booths (cost per booth):

$10.00 (Haywood)
$19.50 (Blount)
$20.00 (Meigs)
$200.00 (Nine counties)
$700.00 (Putnam)
$750.00 (Cannon)

Training staff

$400.00 (Cannon)
$520.00 (Decatur)
$700.00 (Houston)
$22,200.00 (Putnam)
$25,000.00 (Smith)
$38,739.00 (Williamson)

Security containers (cost per container):

$25.00 (Haywood, Johnson)
$36.00 (Coffee)
$44.95 (Scott)
$2,800.00 (Williamson)
$3,085.00 (Blount)
$5,200.00 (Putnam)

Delivering scanners:

$144.00 (Bledsoe)
$200.00 (Sequatchie)
$240.00 (Marshall)
$10,800.00 (Carter)
$20,000.00 (Wayne)
$20,400.00 (Sumner)
$21,420.00 (Williamson)

Printing Manuals:

$50.00 (Benton)
$110.00 (Marshall)
$160.00 (Van Buren)
$5,000.00 (Grundy, Sevier, Smith)

Storage of ballots

$0 (Davidson)
$50.00 (Houston)
$203.00 (Cocke)
$300.00 (Hawkins)
$7,152.00 (Sumner)
$10,000.00 (Johnson)
$70,000.00 (Campbell)

Audit

$100.00 (Moore)
$136.00 (Anderson)
$160.00 (Haywood)
$6,600.00 (Davidson)
$10,000.00 (Dyer & Tipton)
$13,000.00 (Campbell)
$15,750.00 (Hawkins)
$15,840.00 (Washington)
$20,000.00 (Knox and Smith)

Privacy booths will cost $10 apiece in Haywood county, but they will cost $750 apiece in Cannon county. Security containers will cost $25 a piece in Johnson county, but they will cost $5,200 apiece in Putnam county. Cannon county can train their staff for $400, but Williamson county will spend $38,739 to do the same thing. And on and on and on. Bottom line: The numbers are not trustworthy and do not provide a reasonable basis for delaying the implementation of this legislation.

In addition, studies in North Carolina, Maryland and Florida have shown that voting with paper ballots (counted by optical scan machines) is 30-40% cheaper than voting on paperless electronic voting machines like the ones we use now. Why? Because a precinct only needs one machine to count the paper ballots as opposed to the multiple machines – 4, 8, 10, 20, etc. – needed to accommodate voters now. This reduction in the number of machines also means a reduction in expensive programming, software, maintenance, and storage costs. In other words, fewer voting machines means real cost savings.

So the two questions the members of the House Budget subcommittee should ask Coordinator Goins during tomorrow’s meeting are, “why the disparity in the numbers” and “what’s with all the excuses?”

My suggestion to House Dems is to let Rep. Curry Todd’s original bill pass so that Republicans follow through with their original plan of repealing the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act. Or in the words of Rep. Henry Fincher (D, the fightin’ 42nd!) during today’s House Democratic Caucus meeting, “let them drive the bus off the road” because this bus comes with almost unanimous support and doing so would be the opposite of a popular thing to do. Tennesseans, no matter what ideological stripe – want their paper ballots.

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“Tennessee Elections are in Trouble” Friday continues with Mark Goins, Tennessee’s Election Coordinator, who says he is comfortable with the paperless electronic voting machines Tennesseans use to vote in 93 out of 95 counties.

He’s so comfortable with these machines, in fact, that he is spearheading the push to delay the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act – also known as the paper ballot bill that was passed almost unanimously in the Tennessee General Assembly in 2008 – until 2012.

Coordinator Goins: I don’t think the DREs [paperless electronic voting machines]…I’m comfortable with the machines we have. Obviously, you aren’t.

Which means…

  • Tennessee State Election Coordinator Mark Goins doesn’t care that a 2006 report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, one of the government’s premier research centers, condemned paperless electronic voting machines because they they are not secure and don’t “allow election officials to recount ballots independently from a voting machine’s software.”
  • He doesn’t care that the same report stated that “a single programmer could ‘rig’ a major election.”
  • He doesn’t see anything wrong that in a close election his office would not be able to perform a meaningful recount.
  • He doesn’t see anything wrong with machines programmed with secret proprietary vote counting software that he is unable to study, which therefore violates the “vote in private, count in public” axiom.
  • He doesn’t care that paperless electronic voting machines totals can be manipulated in the source code or by introducing a virus in one of the unsecure data ports.
  • He doesn’t care that when a paperless electronic voting machines crashes or malfunctions, as computers are prone to do, votes can be irretrievably lost.
  • He doesn’t have a problem with paperless electronic voting machines malfuntioning by flipping votes from one candidate to another (the machines used in the West Virginia counties where flipping occurred are the same ones used in Davidson County).
  • He doesn’t care that its actually cheaper for Tennessee counties to run an paper ballot election than it is to run a paperless electronic voting machines elections.
  • He doesn’t care that when a Tennessean votes on a paperless electronic voting machines there is no guarantee that their vote will be counted, let alone counted as cast.

Mark Goins, the man in charge of Tennessee’s elections does not care about the integrity of Tennessee’s elections.

Also, just as an FYI after you watch the video, Coordinator Goins’ assertion that buying optical scan machines to count paper ballots would be a waste of money because they would be obsolete is false. 49 States currently use optical scan machines certified to 2002 standards, including Tennessee (in Pickett and Hamilton counties).

(The man in the video who slaps his head in disbelief is Gathering to Save Our Democracy’s Bernis Ellis, who is an expert on voting technology and has been working tirelessly for 5 years to pass the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act and bring secure and verifiable elections to Tennessee.)

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In light of all the discussion about whether or not we should gut or delay the Voter Confidence Act – the almost unanimously agreed upon election reform bill that would, among other democracy-loving mandates, require Tennesseans to vote on paper – we need to remember why we needed election reform in the state in the first place.

Paperless unverifiable touch-screen voting machines, also knownn as DREs, suck and 93 out of 95 counties in Tennessee currently use them.

Paperless unverifiable touch-screen voting machines are not secure and unreliable.

They flip votes (the machines used in the West Virginia counties where flipping occurred are the same ones used in Davidson County). And whether the vote flipping problems are caused by “buggy” software created by inept programmers or malicious source code doesn’t matter. And besides, we wouldn’t be able to discern the reason because…

The software used in the machines is hidden from us. There is no public scrutiny of the code that counts the votes, which violates the “vote in private, count in public” axiom.

Paperless unverifiable touch-screen voting machines do not allow for any type of meaningful recount. (just ask Tim Barnes).

Paperless unverifiable touch-screen voting machines totals can be manipulated in the source code, by introducing virus in one of the un-secure data ports, or by good ol’ fashioned Kentucky-style vote-fixin’.

When a paperless unverifiable touch-screen voting machine crashes or malfunctions, as computers are prone to do, votes can be irretrievably lost.

When you vote on paperless unverifiable touch-screen voting machines there is no guarantee that your vote will be counted, let alone counted as cast.

As the reasons for delaying the implementation of the Voter Confidence Act pile up, we must keep in mind our ultimate goal – free, fair, and trustworthy elections.

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